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The question arises in the analysis of foreign policy 
decision making regarding how consensus or approval by the public 
is attained for policies. Some authors have suggested that con-
sensus is obtained through the manipulation of opinion by decision 
makers. One case often cited as an example of manipulation is the 
1947 announcement of the Truman Doctrine . 
In determining the validity of these arguments a review was 
conducted of the language of the doctrine and the interpretations 
of newspaper columnists. In addition, a review of personal docu-
ments of the decision makers was conducted to determine their 
impressions. 
The data compiled from these sources indicate that the 
authors who claim manipulation might have exaggerated the case. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The decision by the Truman Administration in February 
and March of 1947 to provide aid and assistance to Greece 
and Turkey has been heralded as a landmark event in American 
foreign policy. The announcement of the Truman Doctrine 
has been labeled as "an incomparable assumption of 
responsibility, in the United States' own right, of a kind 
never assumed before."l Essentially, the responsibilities 
that the United States assumed were those of a principle 
actor in a balance of power, a role which has remained 
constant for the United States until today. 2 
While many of the historical works on the subject of 
the Truman Doctrine have lauded the "cooperative effort"3 
between the various government departments, the press, 
Congress and the public, as an example of a consensus in 
foreign policy, the Truman Doctrine and its so-called 
consensus are not without controversy. One body of 
literature has suggested that the consensus among the press 
and the public was created or "manipulated"4, and that the 
primary instrument of this political control or manipulation 
was "domestic propaganda 115 disseminated among the press 
and the public by policy making elites. 
If one is to either prove or disprove the contentions 
of those who argue the "manipulation thesis"6, one needs 
to analyze a number of factors pertinent to the discussion. 
To begin with, both the terms manipulation and propaganda 
2 
are used in the works of these manipulation theorists: it is 
important to understand their meanings. Webster's Third 
International Dictionary defines manipulation as: 
"management of the use of unfair, scheming or underhanded 
methods especially for one's own advantage." Webster 
further defines propaganda as: 
doctrines, ideas, arguments, facts or allegations 
spread by deliberate effort through any medium of 
communication in order to further one's cause or to 
damage an opposing cause. 
Th~ implication is that manipulation of opinion through the 
use of propaganda to gain support for foreign policies is 
deceptive and therefore wrong. While this notion might 
certainly be a sufficient question for a thesis in itself, 
it is merely a point of departure in this case. This paper 
will instead focus on one event in American foreign policy 
and evaluate the criticisms of the body of theorists who 
advocate the manipulation theory. If these manipulation 
theorists are in fact correct, one might expect to find 
evidence to suggest that administration policy making elites 
used 
unfair, scheming and underhanded ••• doctrines, 
ideas, arguments, facts and allegations spread by 
deliberate effort through any medium of communication 
in order to further [their] own cause or damage an 
opposing cause. 
3 
The analysis, therefore, will center on discussions of the 
language used in the public presentations, theories of 
language and communication in politics, and perceptions of 
the central actors in the decision making process to 
determine the extent to which this language could be labeled 
propaganda. 
This analysis will begin with a review of the 
historical interpretations of the formulations and 
implementations of the policies proposed by the Truman 
Doctrine. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: The 
Viking Press, 1955) p. 161. 
2Louis Rene Beres, Reason and Realpolitik: U.S. 
Foreign Policy and World Order (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath 
and Company, 1984> pp. 1-2. 
3Jones, The Fifteen Weeks pp. vii, 12, 150. 
4 
4Micheal Leigh, Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion 
and American Foreign Policy, 1937-1947 (Westport: Greenwood 
Press, 1976) p. 141; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of 
Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 
1945-1954 {New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972) 
p. 333. 
5Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the 
Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Relations 
and Internal Security, 1946-1948 {New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1972) p. 88. 
6Leigh, Mobilizing Consent p. 160. Among those 
authors considered to be "manipulation theorists" are 
Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United 
States in the Third World (New York: World Publishing Co., 
1968); Doris A. Graber, Public Opinion,· The President, and 
Foreign Policy: Four Case Studies from the Formative Years 
{New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968); David 
Horowitz, Free World Colossus {New York: Hill and Wang, 
Inc., 1965); Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: 
The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New 
York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972). 
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HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 
Much of 1946 had been taken up in Washington with 
negative reactions to Soviet policies. The Soviets 
reportedly were applying "direct pressure"1 to Iran and 
Turkey. In addition, the Soviets were making hostile 
speeches and encroaching on other countries including Greece 
and the nations of Eastern Europe.2 These events led to a 
recognition on the part of the State Department and the 
Truman Administration that a new approach would have to be 
taken in dealing with the Soviet Union. 
The focus of the new approach which the Administration 
chose to take was outlined in a long dispatch from Moscow by 
Soviet expert and State Department official George Kennan. 
Kennan's report viewed Soviet intransigence in terms of the 
Soviet perception of an innate antagonism with the Western 
World, and that this antagonism would continue until the 
Soviet Union had destroyed the capitalist nations. It is 
from this antagonism and its underlying ideology which 
Kennan suggested that Soviet foreign policy be viewed. 
Kennan argued that this underlying ideology would cause the 
Soviets to continue their policies of expansion. They would 
be constantly attempting to gain new areas of control 
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through violence and subversion. The response by the United 
States, according to Kennan should be one of attempting to 
contain the Soviets in those spheres of influence they have 
already attained. 
Kennan believed that the most rational method for 
achieving this "containment" was to grant aid to those 
countries which had suffered because of the war. Assumedly 
these were the areas which were most vulnerable to any type 
of Soviet incursions. The Kennan report argued that 
Soviet expansion had to be countered by promoting the 
"security" of those countries not under Soviet 
domination.3 
In addition to the Kennan report, the attitude of the 
Truman Administration towards the Soviet Union was somewhat 
influenced by the British attitude towards the Soviets. 
This British attitude was expressed by Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill in a speech at Fulton, Missouri in which 
he called for, "an alliance of English speaking peoples" and 
an avoidance of appeasement.4 Thus, the role of being a 
principal actor in the international balance of power was 
thrust upon the United States. Under the leadership of 
Secretary of State James Byrnes, the U.S. announced its 
policy of "firmness and patience," in which the American 
position would be a firm stance to induce the Soviets to 
"play the game in the American way."5 
Because of a hostile Congress and a public whose 
opinions on the issue ranged from apathy to isolationism,6 
however, the Truman Administration was not fully able to 
apply the type of pressure it would have liked; the 
costs and commitments of such pressure would not have 
been tolerated in the American Post WWII climate of 
isolationism.7 To pursue the policy of containment 
suggested by Kennan something needed to change. This 
change came in February of 1947. 
7 
On February 21, 1947 the British Ambassador in 
Washington, Lord Inverchappel, delivered two notes to 
American officials in the State Department; one note 
concerned Greece and the other concerned Turkey. The notes 
essentially stated that Great Britain, strained by the costs 
of the war, would no longer be able to meet its commitments 
in these two countries. Britain had been supporting the 
Greek government with assistance for the civil war that they 
had been engaged in with rebels who were presumed to be 
sponsored by the Soviets. The British had also been 
assisting Turkey which was faced with an increase of Soviet 
troops along its border with the u.s.s.R. Spanier points 
out, "the import of the British notes was clear: that a 
Soviet breakthrough could be prevented only by an all out 
American commitment." 8 This, of course, meant that 
funds would have to be obtained by making a request to 
Congress. 
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While this American commitment was apparently 
necessary, the problem of an apathetic public and a hostile 
Congress still existed. In the week immediately following 
the presentation of the British notes a group of leading 
Senators and Representatives met in the White House to hear 
then Secretary of State Marshall's summary of the situation. 
Present at the meeting were some of the most influential 
members of Congress, including members of the Senate 
Appropriations and Foreign Relations Committees, and members 
of the House Appropriations and Foreign Affairs Committees. 
The President wanted to get the reaction of these individuals 
to the problem, as their influence and approval would be 
vital if aid were to be administered in Greece and Turkey. 
Secretary Marshall began the presentation to the 
Congressmen, but as Jones argues, his rather "dry and 
economical terms" and "cryptic presentation" of the problem 
did not serve the desired purpose of convincing the 
Congressmen as to the urgency of the aid to Greece and 
Turkey. In fact, it seems that Marshall's presentation had 
left the "overall impression that aid should be extended to 
Greece on grounds of loyalty and humanitarianism and to 
Turkey to strengthen Britain's position in the Middle 
East. 119 At this point Mr. Acheson was given the floor and 
proceeded to describe the situation in somewhat different 
terms. Acheson rhetorically painted a picture of an 
aggressive Soviet Union "encroaching" on Turkey, Germany 
9 
and other "democratic" states while continuing to apply 
"pressure" on Greece, inching toward the ultimate goal of 
"domination" of the Middle East and "penetration" into South 
Asia and Africa.10 
This emotional language served the purpose. Regarding 
the Acheson presentation, Jones notes, 
When he finished a profound silence ensued that 
lasted perhaps ten seconds. It was broken by the voice 
of Senator Vandenburg. Slowly and with gravity, 
Vandenburg said that he had been greatly impressed, even 
shaken by what he had heard ••• He felt that it was 
absolutely necessary that any request of Congress for 
funds and authority to aid Greece and Turkey be 
accompanied by a message to Congress, and an explanation 
to the American people, in which the grim facts of the 
larger situation should be laid publicly on thI
1
line as 
they had been at their meeting there that day. 
Since Vandenburg had traditionally been one of the leading 
advocates of the isolationist attitude it was clear that 
Acheson's presentation had a profound effect. Seeing how 
effective this type of presentation could be in overcoming 
the isolationist and apathetic mood, President Truman 
appointed Undersecretary Acheson to head the staff which was 
to draft his speech. 
With Acheson having been assigned to the State, War, 
Navy coordinating Committee which was to form the 
information program from which the Truman speech was to be 
drafted, it was expected that the presentation to the public 
would be full of the same emotional rhetoric which was used 
by Acheson in his presentation to the Congressional leaders. 
The result of the S.W.N.C.C. 's work was a paper titled, 
Public Information Program on United States Aid to Greece, 
and it was from this document that the rhetoric was 
virtually lifted word for word and incorporated 
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in the first draft of the President's message ••••• It 
survived all subsequent revisions almost intact1 most of the few alterations being additions by Acheson. 2 
Primarily because of Acheson's treatment of the 
presentation and Vandenburg's later suggestion regarding the 
need for public disclosure, 
The State Department Public Information officers 
recommended a program to portray the word conflict 
between free and totalitarian or imposed forms of 
government in order to make the American peopt~ 
recognize the importance of the Greek crisis. 
An understanding of the role of the Public Information 
officers in the drafting of the S.W.N.C.C. document and the 
speech by President Truman is important for this paper, and 
is well discussed by Jones. He notes that, in a rare show 
of cooperation, 
The policy-operations officers were among the most 
effective in making suggestions in the tone and content 
of the public approach, and the information officers 
were equally effective in analyzing strategic and 
political considerations •••• The information officers 
with their sensibilities attuned to the publiI4 made a powerful contribution to the Truman Doctrine. 
The draft of the Truman speech by the S.W.N.C.C. 
underwent some further minor revisions by Clark Clifford, 
who at the time was Special Counsel to the President. Many 
of the changes which Clifford proposed dealt with the tone 
of the message. Clifford, as did Acheson, saw the value in 
a "dramatic"lS presentation of the situation to the 
American people. He argued that the speech should contain 
language which could serve to present the situation to the 
public in the "strongest possible" terms. Jones cites some 
examples of Clifford's inclusions, 
This is a serious course upon which we embark. 
I would not recommend it except that the alternative is 
more serious •••• The seeds of totalitarian regimes are 
nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in 
the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their 
full growig when the hope of a people for a better life 
has died. 
It is argued that this type of language, with its 
emotional content was included in the draft of President 
Truman's speech to persuade those individuals who might not 
be persuaded by a precise rational presentation of the 
facts. This type of presentation had failed once before, 
when Secretary Marshall attempted to explain the situation 
to the group of Congressional leaders. Only when 
Mr. Acheson presented the problem in more dramatic language 
did those present accept and, in fact, understand the need 
for aid to Greece and Turkey. More importantly those who 
heard the presentations at the White House were those who 
presumably had some interest and attention to foreign 
affairs. If they did not respond to the factual 
presentation of the problem, it was very unlikely that an 
apathetic public would respond to such a presentation 
either. Hence, the Truman Doctrine was couched in broad 
policy terms and intended to "scare the hell out of"1 7 




The setting for the Truman speech on March 12th, 1947 
was extremely dramatic. Jones notes that the House floor and 
its galleries were jammed. 
Every clerk, secretary, or functionary on 
Capitol Hill whose familiar face would gi~ him 
past a guard at a door was on the floor. 
At 12:45 p.m. the President pro tempore of the Senate, 
Senator Vandenburg, and other members of the Senate entered 
and Vandenburg mounted the rostrum. At 12:57 p.m. the 
members of the President's Cabinet entered the room, at 1:00 
p.m. the Speaker of the House announced the President, who 
was escorted in by three Senators and three Representatives. 
Truman entered to a loud ovation and mounted the rostrum. 
The first words he spoke implied the threat and conveyed the 
urgency which he desired to express to the world. 
Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress 
of the United States, the gravity of the situation which 
confronts the world today necessitates my appearance be-
fore a joint session of Congress. The foreign polifg and 
the national security of this country are involved. 
Truman went on to discuss his specific proposals for 
supplying economic and military assistance to Greece and 
Turkey. Interestingly, and perhaps for purposeful reasons, 
every time the President mentioned Greece it was proceeded or 
followed by the adjective •democratic• in some form or 
another. 
Greece must have assistance if it is to become a 
self-respecting democracy •••• There is no country to which 
democratic Greece can turn •••• No other nation is willing 
and able to provi~8 necessary support for a democratic 
Greek government. 
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Truman also discussed the importance of maintaining the 
"national integrity" of Turkey and the importance of that 
integrity to the preservation of order in the Middle East. 
Using such terms in discussing Greece and Turkey was an 
interesting device to suggest a strong need for a United 
States commitment. 
Beyond the questionable message which Truman was 
imparting regarding these specific areas of the world, the 
Truman Doctrine in its wider context addressed the notion of 
a United States foreign policy that must be, 
••• willing to help free peoples to maintain 
their free institutions and their national integrity 
against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon 
them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank 
recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free 
peoples, by direct or indirect aggression undermine the 
foundations of international peace and hence the 
security of the United States •••• I believe it must be 
the policy of the United States to support free peoples 
who are resisting attempted subjugatf on by armed 
minorities or by outside pressures.2 
After making these allusions to a threat to the "national 
security" of the United States caused by "aggressive 
movements" attempting to "subjugate" a "free democratic" 
Greek state, the President requested from Congress 
approximately $400 million in economic and military 
assistance. 
Following the speech the President briskly exited from 
the House floor. His speech was met with applause but not 
the boisterous response which usually followed a Presidential 
address. Although the impact of the President's address 
was not immediately felt, it was not slow in coming. Jones 
notes regarding the response to the address, "it was 
tremendous, somewhat confused, and on the whole 
favorable. 1122 Poll data collected in the weeks following 
the announcement of the Truman Doctrine tend to confirm the 
statements made by Jones. 
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The survey data used in this paper was collected 
following the announcement of the Truman Doctrine by the 
American Institute of Public Opinion and the National Opinion 
Research Center. The results were published in issues of the 
journal, Public Opinion Quarterly in 1947. 23 
The first poll concerning the proposals for aid to 
Greece and Turkey was taken just two weeks after the March 
12th speech, (see index, Table 1). While this poll does 
show a majority in favor of the Truman proposals, it is 
clear that no sweeping consensus existed regarding his 
proposals. Two polls taken in later months seem to suggest 
that the majority in favor of the Truman proposals was 
steadily increasing. A poll taken by the National Opinion 
Research Center in April of 194724 suggests that the 
percentage of support for the Truman proposals had increased 
from 56 to 67 percent, (see appendix, Table 2). Upon closer 
analysis of this poll one sees that the support is only for 
that part of the proposals that calls for economic aid, the 
proposals calling for the provision of military assistance 
for Greece and Turkey were disapproved overwhelmingly. A 
third poll taken in June of 1947 suggests that the 
majority of those who favored the proposals-presumably 
for both economic and military aid-was increasing. 
This time from 56 to 66 percent percent, (see appendix, 
Table 3). 
The historical information and the poll data appear 
to indicate, in general, that the policy proposals of the 
Truman Doctrine speech were met with a moderate approval 
which increased over time. This suggests that if any 
feelings of isolationism or apathy among the public and 
Congress existed at the time of the announcement, the 
information campaign initiated by the administration 
changed these feelings. 
The sequence of events noted above indicates that the 
formulation of policy preceded any public demand for 
action. This is consistent with the arguments of a number 
of authors regarding the way foreign policy is made.2 5 
One assumes that foreign policy decision makers establish 
goals based on their interpretation and analysis of the 
information and then attempt to achieve those goals by the 
most rational or effective means.26 If this is the 
case, then the Truman administration must have perceived 
that containment of the Soviet Union was the goal they 
desired to achieve, but having doubts about the public's 
and Congress' willingness to accept these proposals, the 
administration determined that it would have to initiate an 
15 
information campaign to build consensus and, thereby, 
support for the aid proposals. 
16 
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MANIPULATION AND SYMBOLISM 
The arguably questionable way in which the public 
information campaign and the Truman Doctrine were formulated 
and presented to the public has led a number of historians 
to question whether the attempt to build support for the 
Greek-Turkish aid proposals went beyond an informational 
campaign. More than one of those historians has used 
the term manipulation in referring to the activities of 
those organizing the public information effort. 1 The 
evidence usually presented as the basis for such assertions 
is the use of emotional and questionable language in the 
public comments by officials,2 the numerous, and 
arguably dubious, allusions to crisis, 3 and the 
difference in reactions that were to be found in the poll 
data when the questions were phrased in a more emotional 
fashion.4 These arguments imply a massive propaganda 
effort on the part of the Truman administration to 
"sell"S the Greek-Turkish aid proposals to the American 
public. 
Much literature has been written on the subject of 
how the government uses propaganda and language to sway an 
uninformed and unaware public. The bulk of this literature 
concentrates on the notion of symbolism in politics. An 
understanding of symbolism and its application to the 
question of consensus building in American Foreign policy 
is best achieved by reviewing some of the arguments 
presented by the most prominent authors. 
These authors argue that many of the actions which a 
state, especially the United States, takes are done for 
symbolic purposes; this includes many of the ceremonial 
acts, the public declarations and the various functions of 
the government.6 These actions are quite often symbolic 
in themselves, or they include language or procedures which 
could be considered symbolic. 
By symbolic, we mean those actions that are taken 
intending to elicit a non-rational response from the 
audience receiving the signal. Rather than a reasoned 
debate about the true merits of political choices, the 
American public is often subjected to words, phrases, 
settings and actions which serve to symbolize myths. These 
myths, having been ingrained in our consciousness since 
childhood by folklore, fables, songs, religion, family and 
entertainment media serve to arouse emotional rather than 
reasoned thought processes. These emotional thought 
processes both obscure our rational abilities and dictate 
our responses to what have been suggested to us as being 
political issues. W. Lance Bennett differentiates between 
20 
"primary process thinking" and "secondary process 
thinking"?; the latter being a rational thought process 
and the former being, 
projection, fantasy, the incorporation of 
nonverbal imagery, a high emotional content, the easy 
connection of disparate ideas, the failure to make 
underlying assumptions expl~cit, and the generation of 
multiple levels of meaning. 
Many types of actions, both verbal and nonverbal, can 
be considered symbolic. This study will focus primarily on 
myths, rituals, settings, institutions, threats and 
assurances. Certainly, the symbolic ability of these 
instruments is suggested merely by a casual knowledge of 
each. But a more thorough, specific definition is in order 
to understand to what extent these are symbolic. 
To understand the methods by which governments elicit 
emotional responses from the public about political issues 
one needs to view the political belief system of the 
American public. To do this the literature on the uses of 
myth in American politics and society is important. 
Myths are the primary method by which individuals in 
the government engage in communication with the public. 
21 
Myths are the basic truths about any society. More 
precisely, they are those things that a society believes to 
be its basic truths. They are those things to which members 
of the society feel they should aspire; those things, 
although often ambiguous and highly emotional, which a 
22 
society can believe in. Myths are promulgated by all media, 
and as noted previously, are ingrained in the public 
consciousness. When presented to the public they produce an 
emotional response. Bennett notes, 
Cultural processes produce common social 
understandings and guide people in using these 
understandings to organize life situations, to 
respond to new social conditions, and to accept 
their positions in the social order.9 
In essence, myths define societal values and ideologies, and 
thus contribute to a belief system for individuals who have 
been subjected to the same cultural processes. 
Both Bennett and Murray Edelman note that some of the 
most pervasive myths in American society are those of 
liberty, freedom, democracy and citizen participation. 10 
If one looks closely at these terms, and perhaps attempts to 
define them, one sees the ambiguity that is inherent in each 
term. This ambiguity aids in dissuading the audience from 
trying to employ a reasoned thought process about the 
message they are receiving. To do so would require that 
they define the terms, and this would prove quite taxing if 
not impossible. Few Americans have the time or inclination 
to have read much political theory. It is reasonable to 
assume that most are unfamiliar with the works of Mill, 
Locke, Rousseau or any of those who have spent time 
discussing these issues. In addition to, or perhaps in 
spite of, their ambiguity, the use of the aforementioned 
23 
terms can inspire within most of us a whole host of 
patriotic and nationalistic sentiments. Growing up in 
America, and being exposed to the various cultural and 
political influences which permeate our society is testimony 
to the ease with which these influences could be coordinated 
for effective political control. Knowing this, it is little 
wonder that arguments have been made regarding the 
manipulation of opinion in America. 
Many of the arguments regarding the use of myth in 
political communication in America are bolstered by the 
notion of ritual behavior that governments engage in to 
promulgate and reinforce the public's belief in its myths. 
Bennett defines ritual as follows: 
A ritual can be defined as a set of routine 
procedures used by participants in recurring 
situations. 
-to establish and display the social principles 
(embodied in myth) that the participants agree 
observe in the situation, 
-to show how those principles will 
specific issues in the situation, 
-to ~emonfrrate the reasonableness 
action., 




Many authors, including Bennett and Edelman, maintain 
that elections and the act of voting are ritualistic in 
that they promulgate the myths of democracy and citizen 
participation.12 Edelman notes regarding voting, 
"[Voting] is participation in a ritual act, however, only 
in a minor degree is it participation in policy 
formulation. 0 13 This notion of voting as only a minor 
degree of participation in policy formulation is quite 
24 
important to the argument regarding myths, rituals, and the 
creation of opinion in American politics. Because if ritual 
acts such as voting are not really as important as we have 
been led to believe, then what significance does any opinion 
which a public might express have in policy formulation. In 
his work, Edelman cites a number of authors who argue that 
elections are necessary as they provide the public with some 
forum that essentially makes them believe that they have 
actually participated in a rational policy choice. These 
authors cited by Edelman maintain that without some such 
device for achieving this goal, the legitimacy of the 
government would be lost.14 
Certainly elections are not the only ritual which 
governments utilize as a method of political control. The 
raising and saluting of the flag, the reciting of a pledge 
of allegiance which includes such terms as liberty, freedom 
and justice are also ritual. Some have even mentioned that 
the adversarial system of the trial which is engaged in by 
the United States court system is itself ritualistic. 15 
Arguably then, based on this speculation regarding 
ritual in American politics, a case could be made that such 
things as the language of Presidential requests to Congress 
for items such as economic and military assistance are 
merely ritual in content. Congressmen, having been brought 
up in the United States and having been subjected to the 
same "cultural processes" are just as likely to engage in 
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primary process thinking as most members of the public and 
are just as likely to "understand" the situation in a way 
which is nonrational but desirable by those employing the 
symbols. Presidential speeches, statements before Congress, 
statements made in press conferences and personal appeals 
made by a President to a Congressman for support can also be 
seen as ritual; both for the symbolic language used in these 
communications and because of the reinforcement of the 
publicly held mythical beliefs about American government 
which these acts provide. Edelman notes, 
Political forms thus come to symbolize what large 
masses of men need to believe about the state to 
reassure themselves •••• The point is that every political 
institution and act evokes and reinforces a particular 
response in its audiences •••• In democratic countries 
these institutions reinforce beliefs in the reality of 
citizen participation in government and in the rational 
basis of government decisions, regardless of what is 
said in thr course of the proceedings on particular 
occasions. 6 
Edelman provides us, in his explanation, with other factors 
to view in terms of symbolism. The institutions of 
government and the language that is used by these 
institutions in their rituals is seen as being symbolic and 
initiating primary process thinking by the audience. Since 
the focus of analysis in this paper is a specific event in 
American foreign policy, the Truman Doctrine, we should view 
the institutions whose role were most important, the 
settings which enhanced these institutions and the language 
used by them. 
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Perhaps the pre-eminent institution regarding foreign 
affairs is the office of the President. In addition to the 
broad formal powers which the President possesses regarding 
foreign affairs there is also the enormous power a President 
possesses in his ability to persuade. In other words, 
Presidents enjoy both posited and symbolic power. Perhaps 
the most prominent work on the subject of the President's 
ability to persuade is that by Richard Neustadt. 
Neustadt argues that the Presidential power to 
persuade has its roots in a number of factors. Some of 
these factors are personal or individual to the person 
holding the office at the time. These include his logical 
faculties and his charm. Other factors affecting a 
President's ability to influence the mass and elite public 
are those which are inherent in the off ice that the 
individual holds. These powers include status and 
authority. The President himself is a symbol for every 
person in the country. More appropriately, the office of 
the President is an institution to which members of both the 
mass and elite publics focus their attention, hopes and 
fears. 
The essence of a President's persuasive task is 
to convince such men that what the White House wants of 
them is what they ou~ht to do for their own sake and on 
their own authority. 7 
Perhaps the most interesting and effective device 
employed by individuals, especially the President, for 
reinforcing myths and creating threats and assurances to 
the public is the political speech. If we recall that the 
public tends to respond to emotional stimuli, we can view 
political speeches in this light. Edelman notes, 
Political acts, speeches, and gestures involve 
mass audiences emotionally in politics while rendering 
them acquiesISnt to policy shifts through that very 
involvement. 
While it is important to note the emotive content of the 
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language employed in these speeches, it is equally important 
to discuss the emotional impact of the speech itself. This 
is especially true in the case of a Presidential address, 
primarily because of the symbolism inherent in the Off ice of 
the Presidency and because of the settings that accompany a 
Presidential address. 
Edelman argues that the settings for political acts 
and speeches often employ devices intended to evoke an 
emotional response from the audience, thus they serve as 
symbols to the audience. For instance, the formality of a 
Presidential "State of the Union" address or a speech before 
a joint session of Congress can serve as a symbol of the 
official nature of the speech and this formality can set the 
tone for the seriousness of the message that the speaker is 
delivering. The sight of the President standing at the 
rostrum of the Senate floor, flanked by the Vice-President 
and the speaker of the House, with most of the members of 
his cabinet and congress in session can "prove" to the 
audience the authority of the speaker and the importance of 
the message he is imparting. The remoteness of the speech 
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sets it apart from other types of Presidential public 
appearances. He is not campaigning; he is not answering 
questions from reporters; he is addressing the country and 
indeed the rest of the world. Thus, the formality of this 
type of Presidential speech takes the President out of his 
normal role as an administrator and puts him in the new role 
of teacher. The teaching role of the President has been 
carefully analyzed by Nicholas Berry who cites three 
functions of this role, 
1. To get the attention of those who must act. 
2. To get the acceptance of the goals proposed by 
the leader. 
3. To create a commitment to act a certain way.19 
Berry further argues, 
Teaching sets the stage for concerted action. 
It previews what will happen. It mobilizes energy and 
inflames the spirit. It guides behavior in the creation 
and administration of public policy. It tests the 
proba~ili~0 of success by creating a public reaction. 
What Berry seems to be suggesting is that the Presidential 
"teaching" role is intended to create opinion and is indeed, 
structured for that purpose. There appears to be a strong 
relationship between Berry's "teaching role of the 
President" and Leigh and Kolko's "manipulation." Edelman 
notes, 
The appropriateness of act to setting is normally 
so carefully plotted in the political realm that we are 
rarely conscious of the imp~ftance or the ramifications 
of the tie between the two. 
Beyond the idea of the use of appropriate 
institutional settings in creating symbols, is the use of 
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language for symbolic purposes. Indeed, language is perhaps 
the most evocative instrument available for creating threats 
and assurances to the public. Edelman notes, 
In subtle and obvious ways cultures shape 
vocabulary and meaning, and men respond to verbal 
cues •••. Language becomes a sequence of Pavlovian cues 
rather than an instrument for reasoning and an~~ysis if 
situations and appropriate cue occur together. 
Thus, Edelman argues, language is effective as a symbol 
because of its ability to connote threats and assurances 
that serve as cues for public response. Certain words and 
phrases have distinct meanings to American society, 
especially the mass public, and tend to evoke emotional 
responses. Public officials, especially Presidents, having 
been brought up in American society and having campaigned in 
it are aware of these words or phrases and can employ them 
when they desire the public to respond in a specific way. 
Thus, a speech intended to direct the public towards a 
specific response might employ passionate language. This is 
especially true in a case where the public official 
perceives that the public might not be ready to undertake 
the commitment necessary to fulfill the policy proposed. 
Edelman notes, "language sometimes directly encourages 
behavior contrary to peoples interests. 11 23 
Presumably the public official knows which audience he 
is trying to get a certain response from. Different 
audiences will respond to different styles of speech. 
Edelman cites four styles of speech which "pervade the 
governmental process", these are hortatory, legal, 
administrative and bargaining.2 4 Since the focus of 
this paper is the effect of language and symbols on foreign 
policy consensus-building among the public, attention will 
be paid to that style of speaking best suited for appealing 
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to a primarily uninformed and unconcerned mass public, which 
tends to respond to emotional stimuli. 
Edelman argues that the hortatory language style is 
the most effective for soliciting support for policy among 
the mass public, and is quite often the style employed when 
using symbolic language. Edelman notes, 
The hortatory style consists formally of premises, 
inferences and conclusions, some stated and others 
implied. The conclusions, being promises or threats, 
amount to appeals for public support, and this 
generality of appeal is the style's most conspicuous 
formal element •••• In spite of the almost total ambiguity 
of the terms employed, each instance of the use of this 
language styled is accepted as evidenge of the need for 
widespread support of public policy.2 
The goal of hortatory speaking style is to stress a rational 
approach to a problem by emphasizing the key words. Edelman 
argues, "Audiences value gestures and postures consistent 
with rationality. 112 6 But often the ambiguity of the 
symbolic language used merely gives the impression of 
rationality while really creating an emotional image or 
stimulus for the mass public. Indeed, it is this emotional 
stimulus, often a threat to the country that causes the 
sense of a need for support. 
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It is important at this point to discuss who is 
capable of such a grand task as the determination and the 
distribution of symbols calculated to effect a response from 
the public. If, as noted previously, cultural processes 
dictate the way individuals in the United States perceive 
things, how are some individuals in a position to affect a 
public's perception of foreign policy issues? One must look 
to the numerous elite leadership theories of American 
government for an answer. Specifically, those relating to 
elitism in the foreign policy decision making processes. 
Since much of the information presented in this paper 
has dealt with nonrational or emotional understanding of 
political issues as opposed to rational understandings of 
politics, a body of literature which addresses information 
and awareness levels among the public immediately suggests 
itself for observation. First addressed by Gabriel 
Almond,2 7 then expanded by James Rosenau28 and 
Bernard Cohen, 2 9 this body of literature essentially 
argues that if one considers the American public as a 
whole, approximately 75-90 percent of the public is 
unaware of or inattentive to foreign affairs: of the 
remaining 10-25 percent only a fraction of a percent 
are aware enough, motivated enough and associated enough 
to have a hand in the making of foreign policy. This 
establishes an elite group of individuals to whom the 
avenues of public information and policy formulation are 
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simultaneously open. This elite group serves as a focus for 
any analysis of alleged "manipulation" of public opinion in 
forming consensus or foreign policy issues. Two authors who 
have viewed elite arguments and done research into 
backgrounds of elites within the United States found eight 
distinctive characteristics of elites, and identified four 
members who drafted the Truman Doctrine as elites.30 
The basic elite structure of foreign policy decision 
making is pyramid shaped. In other words, those individuals 
who comprise the elite groups, with the awareness, 
motivation and access to an audience, are at the highest 
level of the pyramid and comprise the smallest group. If 
evidence can be found that individuals within this group 
engaged in or intended to employ specific language to build 
a manipulated consensus on foreign policy issues, then the 
works of authors such as Barnett, Kolko, Freeland, Graber 
and Leigh can be substantiated. If no evidence of any 
intentional misleading of public perception can be found, it 
would be difficult to conclude the accuracy of such claims. 
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IV 
SYMBOLISM AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE 
While the evidence that could clearly support claims 
that public opinion was manipulated in building consensus 
for the Greek-Turkish aid program can be found in the public 
and private documents of policy makers, it is important, 
primarily, to view the various arguments and circumstantial 
evidence which has been put forth as proof of such 
manipulation. Many of those who maintain that such 
manipulation could occur rest their arguments on the 
dramatic nature of the message delivered by the president on 
March 12th 19471 • Indeed, much of the literature on the 
notion of symbolism in politics argues that dramatic 
presentations of issues by leaders, such as the president 
with the symbolic force of his office, are a sure way to 
mobilize support. These arguments hold that certain types 
of language and their tone imply and suggest threats to the 
public, and that this is an effective means for galvanizing 
support. One way in which a threat can be implied and a 
public can be mobilized is by suggesting that a crisis 
exists and must be dealt with. It is argued that this is 
precisely what was done in the Truman Doctrine speech. 
It has been argued that the language of the Truman 
Doctrine was intended to induce an emotional response from 
the public by implying a threat.2 One clear example of 
this threat is the numerous references to the Greek 
situation as being a "Crisis".3 A significant amount of 
research has been conducted regarding the notion of crisis 
in international politics. The potency of the symbol which 
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the term generates is significant and the use of the term in 
this context is important in understanding the symbolic 
language of the Truman doctrine. 
To begin with, crises are situations in which some 
type of unfavorable action is threatened or inflicted. In 
addition, crises are mostly unexpected events. That is, 
they are a surprise to the leaders. Beyond this, crises are 
events which call upon a threatened or inflicted population 
for concerted action, 
More powerfully, perhaps, than any other 
political term, it suggests a need for unity and 
common sacrifice •••. [Itl justif[ies] the actions of 
leaders and the sacrifices leaders demand of 
others.4 
Thus, the notion of crisis corresponds to the discussion by 
Edelman of symbols providing threats and assurances to the 
masses. Crisis sets the tone for any message which is to 
follow. In the case of the Truman Doctrine, the implication 
that the situation in Greece was a crisis left all further 
discussions, including requests for aid, to be viewed in 
that light. The threat of the situation in Greece was 
established before Truman said a word about it. 
The question arises at this point is whether the 
specific situation in Greece in 1946-47 could truly be 
categorized as a crisis. As noted earlier, a good deal of 
research has been conducted concerning the notion of crisis 
in international politics and much of that research centers 
on the classification of crisis situations. At least one 
study found nine different categories into which 
international situations fall.s Applying these criteria 
to the situations in Greece and Turkey during 1947 has led 
another author to conclude that these situations could have 
forgone the crisis labels. 
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Charles Hermann's study of international crisis was 
adopted by Michael Leigh in viewing the situations in Greece 
and Turkey during 1947.6 Leigh found that these 
situations more closely resembled the lowest of Hermann's 
nine classifications: the "administrative situation" rather 
than the highest of the nine classifications: "crisis." 
The characteristics of the "administrative situation" are 
"low threat, short time, and anticipated [events]." 
According to Leigh, these were the characteristics of the 
situations in Greece and Turkey rather than a crisis, which 
is characterized by, "high threat, short time, and 
surprise."7 
On the other hand, one would have a difficult task 
proving that government officials did not perceive the 
situations in Greece and Turkey as crises. Joseph Jones 
argues that a crisis existed in Greece and Turkey. 8 
George Kennan,9 Dean Acheson,10 and President 
Truman,11 have all referred to the Greek-Turkish 
situation in their memoirs as a crisis. And from a 
scholarly perspective on crisis, though not as rigorous as 
that of Hermann, O'Neal and Berlel2 argue that the 
historical data available suggest that a crisis did indeed 
exist at the time. 
As noted in a previous section of this paper, 
The State Department Public Information 
offices recommended a program ••. in order to 
make the American people aware of the Greek 
crisis."13 
Freeland argues that the Truman administration and the 
Truman Doctrine itself, "creat[ed] the crisis of March 
1947."14 Freeland further argues, 
••• it is difficult not to conclude that the 
crisis of March 1947 had its origins in AmeriI~n 
politics rather than developments in Greece." 
Whether the situations in Greece or Turkey were ever 
actually crises is questionable, but the notion that they 
should be labeled as such is very important to the 
manipulation theorists. Edelman, for instance, argues 
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National crises, therefore, have their uses in 
shaping opinion •••• The twentieth century has seen 
economic, military, and social crises succeed one 
another, arg the forseeable future will not be 
different. 
Regarding the labeling of crisis by governments, Edelman 
also notes, 
People who benefit from a crisis are easily able 
to explain it to themselves and to the mass public in 
terms that mask or minimize their own contributions and 
incentives while highlighting outside threats and 
unexpected occurrences. The divergence between the 
symbolic import of crises and theif material impact is 
basic to their popular acceptance. 7 
The Greek situation being labeled a crisis when the 
objective evidence may not support such a label appears to 
correspond with Edelman's interpretation of such a 
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classification. The language used to support the claim that 
the situations in Greece and Turkey were crises was also 
ambiguous. It is this language that will be the focus of 
this paper. 
The manipulation theorists argue that, with the tone 
of the message being in the context of a crisis situation, 
the threat was implanted in the minds of the American press, 
Congress and public. It then became the task of the 
administration to nurture the threat with more ambiguous 
terminology that both added to the threat by appearing to 
explain the extent of the crisis, and reassuring the public 
as to the methods by which the administration was meeting 
the challenge of the threat. Edelman notes, 
Any regime that prides itself on crisis management 
is sure to find crises to manage, and crisis 
management is always available as a way to mobilize 
public support. 8 
The language used to nurture the notion of crisis 
contained the same emotive content that is discussed by 
Edelman in his work, The Symbolic Uses of Politics. These 
words or phrases can be termed as key symbols or slogans. 
Key symbols and slogans serve as emotional stimuli to an 
audience or public which, according to Edelman, tends to 
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respond primarily based on their emotional rather than their 
logical faculties. 
According to Harold Lasswell, key symbols and 
slogans, 
provid[e] a common experience for everyone in the 
state, ranging from the most powerful boss to the 
humblest layman or philosopher. Indeed, one of the few 
experiences that bind human beings together, 
irrespective of race, region, occupation, party or 
religion, is exposure to the same set of key words. 
Sentiments of loyalty cluster around these terT~' and 
contribute to the loyalty of the commonwealth. 
Edelman argues that, in addition to having a sentimental 
appeal to the commonwealth, key symbols have the ability to 
stimulate perceptions of threat and assurance to the public 
audience, this of course, depending on the symbol used. The 
main characteristic of the symbols commonly used in the 
rhetoric of politics is the ambiguity attached to each term. 
It is this ambiguity which, many would suggest, allows the 
public to be seduced or enraged by the symbols employed by 
the administration. 
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Some symbols seem to emerge as ones which the 
administration emphasized when drafting the Truman Doctrine. 
This section of the paper will attempt to analyze the 
March 12, 1947 Presidential address for terms or phrases 
which could be considered symbolic, or could have been 
inserted to ensure public support. Perhaps the most obvious 
of the symbols employed by the Truman Doctrine is concept 
"democracy." The adjective "democratic" was questionable, 
to say the least, when applied to the Greek state of 
1947.20 Truman and his staff knew this fact, yet the 
speech contained three specific references made about the 
Greek state using some form of the word democratic prior to 
Truman's admonition of Greece for its "extremist measures." 
Perhaps those who drafted the Truman Doctrine saw the 
value in using such terms. Edelman suggests that the term 
"democracy" is symbolic21 in that it suggests to 
Americans that the government in question is legitimate and, 
in fact, conducts its internal affairs in the same way in 
which they are conducted in the United States. Thus, 
"democracy" appeals to the American Public, it is synonymous 
with the American perception of good government. It appeals 
to the myth of citizen participation which has been 
ingrained in the American belief system through a variety of 
cultural processes. 
It could be argued that, by employing the term 
democracy and the emotional baggage which the term carries 
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with it, the Truman administration was casting the mold for 
the American public to perceive Greece as a friendly ally. 
Whether the administration was exaggerating the facts is a 
point of debate. It is clear, however, that the American 
public had little general knowledge of the situation within 
Greece and Turkey prior to the Truman Doctrine. This fact 
is evidenced by a poll taken in March of 1947, asking the 
American people questions about their knowledge of the 
political situations within Greece and Turkey, Csee 
appendix, Table 4). In each case the percentage of the 
American public with "no opinion" or no knowledge of the 
internal political climates of Greece and Turkey was higher 
than those answering either yes or no. According to the 
manipulation theorists, the fact that the American public 
was not aware of the situation in Greece and Turkey, and for 
the most part, was not even aware of the types of 
governments in these countries, suggests that the language 
employed by the Truman Doctrine, especially the references 
to a "democratic" Greek state, was implanted to build the 
perception among the American public that Greece and Turkey 
were friendly allies and deserved United States assistance. 
Numerous other symbols were employed by the drafters 
of the Truman Doctrine. A review of the text of the speech 
yields many terms which would fall into the categories 
established by Edelman and Lasswell. Among these other 
symbols to be found in the text of the Truman Doctrine 
are those on the positive, or as noted by Lasswell, 
"indulgent" side, meaning those symbols which provide 
assurances; and on the other, "deprivation"22 side we 
find terms to evoke negative emotions or threats, (see 
appendix, Table 5). 
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That the American public was virtually unaware of 
events in Greece and Turkey, or in most areas of the world 
at that time, is evidenced by passages and polls cited 
above. The arguments by Edelman, Lasswell and Bennett state 
that symbolic language serves as a cue for the uninformed 
voter. This type of language elicits a response, either 
positive or negative depending on the symbol employed, and 
this response dictates the attitude or opinions which a good 
deal of the public will have regarding the issue in 
question. 
Authors such as Leigh, Freeland, Graber, Barnet, and 
Kolko argue that the language of the Truman Doctrine and the 
press coverage, both prior to and after this speech, was 
engineered by the administration, specifically the State, 
War, Navy Coordinating Committee, Undersecretary Acheson, 
Clark Clifford and various other individuals who advised the 
committee. Jones notes that prior to the announcement by 
Truman on March 12, 1947 a campaign was conducted by the 
members of the SWNCC and the State Department Public 
Information Off ice to persuade the members of the press of 
the need for the Greek aid. Acheson held background talks 
with representatives of the press and radio 
broadcasters,23 these talks were productive, "News and 
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radio men collected and spread the pollen of information and 
speculation among Congressmen, government officials, and the 
public."24 Jones further notes, 
If the government was reluctant to speak publicly 
of the decline in British power and to suggest that the 
time had come when any hope for peace and well-being in 
the world required that the United States step into the 
role formerly played by Great Britain, publi~ 
commentators and editorial writers were not. 5 
Whether the public information campaigns and the 
background talks had any great effect on the outcome of the 
press and ultimately the public support for the 
Greek-Turkish aid is questionable at this point. Certainly, 
if the arguments of Edelman and others are valid, and the 
general public responds to symbolic language in an emotional 
way, then the members of the press are likely to respond in 
a similar fashion. The literature on the subject of press 
response to government information campaign is varied. At 
least one author maintains that the press tended to respond 
to "cues" furnished by the administration.26 This 
notion of cues suggests that some type of semantic or 
psychological stimulus was presented by the administration 
that the press responded to and subsequently, relayed to the 
American public. It has been argued that the type of 
stimuli employed by the administration in the case of the 
Truman Doctrine were verbal and non-verbal symbols. 
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The above argument suggests that the press is often 
"used" by government officials to advance policy. While 
this argument is true in many respects, it is misleading to 
assume that the press is in collusion with the 
administration in an attempt to dupe the American public 
into accepting policy. For the most part, the press is 
reluctant to admit that they are ever "used by government 
officials. 11 27 Yet even when the press is being used 
they are doing their job. Bernard Cohen notes, 
If you have a policy, you have something that 
makes a good story for a reporter ••• The news agency may 
grumble and call it 'propaganda' but they dutifully 
report as 'hard news' most of what the State Department 
News Officer offers them by way 05
8
official Department 
statements at his noon briefings. 
Cohen argues that because the press is constrained by 
its neutrality in reporting foreign affairs, it 
more easily lends itself to the uses of others and 
particularly to public officials whom reporters have 
come to regard as prime sources of news ~grely by 
virtue of their positions in government. 
While these arguments seem to suggest that a confidence 
exists between press and government people, they do not 
necessarily suggest that the press will respond to the 
symbolic language in a way similar to the general public. 
Indeed, one would expect that most foreign affairs or 
administration reporters would be familiar enough with the 
ways of Washington that they would attempt to by-pass 
primary thought processes and view the aid proposals in 
their realistic meaning. While in some cases this 
expectation is fulfilled, in many instances it is not. 
According to Cohen, 
Those who are concerned with [the] images of the 
world will note that the way the press goes about 
shaping the pattern of public information is not 
characterized by any orderly or systematic approach to 
the substance of foreign affairs, nor by any explicit 
understanding of what public information might usefully 
consist in.3 
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Thus, Cohen appears to be arguing that since the press 
is primarily unfamiliar with and unaware of the complexities 
of foreign affairs, as is the general public, they are in 
the same position to be affected by the emotional appeals 
and symbolic language of government officials. If this is 
so, and the arguments of Cohen and others are accepted, then 
this would seem to support arguments of those who maintain 
that government officials direct press and public response 
to political issues. However, while the evidence thus far 
presented might tend to support such assertions, another 
body of literature might tend to dispute them. 
Some have suggested that the press serves as a 
restricting force on what is possible in the area of foreign 
affairs.31 One study has even suggested that the press, 
specifically the printed media, performs an "agenda setting" 
function for the mass public.32 
The main media force attention to certain issues. 
They build up public images of political figures. They 
are constantly presenting objects suggesting what 
individuals in the m~~s should think about, know about, 
have feelings about. 
This latter body of literature would appear to contradict 
the information presented by Cohen which argues that elites 
and top government officials direct messages to individuals 
in the press who merely relay these messages to the public. 
A study with similar findings about the agenda setting 
function of the mass media concludes the following, 
We do not mean our results to be taken as an 
indication of political mischief at the networks. In 
deciding what to cover, editors and journalists are 
influenced most by organizational routines, internal 
power struggles, and commercial imperativ~~· This 
leaves little room for political motives. 
Such statements provide the student of foreign policy 
with a perplexing problem. It is difficult to accept the 
arguments that so-called political elites are in a position 
to manipulate the press, and there-by the mass public, when 
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evidence suggests that the press is more directed by its own 
bureaucratic structure and desire to sell papers. Moreover, 
it is difficult to accept all of the claims made by those 
who argue that opinion is manipulated by symbolic language. 
Clearly, parts of their arguments make sense, but one 
remains skeptical. To rely, as do Leigh, Freeland, Barnett, 
Kolko and others, on the evidence presented is insufficient 
for one to conclude that elites manipulated opinion with the 
Truman Doctrine. 
Perhaps evidence is available to resolve our problems. 
If an analysis of the press coverage during the weeks 
surrounding the March 12, 1948 announcement of the Truman 
Doctrine is conducted, one might observe similarities 
between the language used by the press in its editorial 
comment and that of those so called elites to determine if 
there is any evidence of manipulation. In addition, by 
viewing the text of speeches, memoirs, public and private 
documents of these elites one might find positive evidence 
of plans for manipulation. If so, this might prove 
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THE ROLE OF BELIEF SYSTEM 
An analysis of the press coverage, primarily the 
editorial coverage, should provide evidence to support or 
deny that the use of symbolic language was instrumental in 
building a public consensus for the Greek-Turkish aid 
proposals. Past studies give an indication of what form 
this analysis should take. Harold Lasswell and others 
analyzed pre-war and wartime propaganda through the German 
and American press. Using content analysis Lasswell 
concluded that the appeal of emotional or symbolic language 
is quite forceful as a means of domestic propaganda for 
supporting foreign policies.l This is consistent with the 
works of Edelman and Bennett, but is directed more 
specifically to the area of foreign, rather than domestic 
policies. 
Lasswell's analysis was extensive in its scope; 
reviewing countless volumes of periodicals and newspapers 
for many months, he identified and weighted specific words 
and phrases for their symbolic value and then coded the 
statistical data to record frequencies of usage of the 
terrns. 2 
This study is intended to follow along a course 
similar to that of Lasswells, yet not in such an 
exhaustive manner. We may even find evidence and 
arguments to challenge those of Lasswell. If, as 
Bernard Cohen argues, in their zeal to persuade the 
American public to accept the administration's policy 
proposals, the opponents of public information programs 
often cross the "dividing line between education and 
propaganda, 114 it seems important to determine whether 
this line was crossed in the campaign for the Truman 
Doctrine. 
This study will observe editorial coverage of the 
events in Greece and Turkey during the interim two week 
period between the submission of the British notes 
regarding the ceasing of support for Greece and the 
announcement of the Truman Doctrine. Editorial coverage 
was chosen because one can observe quite clearly just what 
a columnist thinks about a specific issue, and this is 
often an indication of what the general public thinks. 
Moreover, through the language a columnist uses to 
describe the situation one can often find instances of 
symbolism. One might assume that if propaganda techniques 
being employed by the administration are being responded 
to by columnists, then in all probability there will be a 
similar response by the public. Most of the authors 
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on the subject of symbolism argued that symbols affect all 
levels of society in similar ways. 
The sources of the editorial coverage were the New 
York Times and the Washington Post. These sources were 
chosen because they have consistently had a reputation as 
"prestige papers. 115 In other words, both papers regularly 
include virtually all the information regarding foreign 
affairs available to the press. Regarding the New York 
Times, Cohen notes, 
the Times is the newspaper of record •••• It is the 
source which is ref erred to by virtually everyone in 
government who hgs an interest or a responsibility in 
foreign affairs. 
In addition to the above factors, two of the sources for 
this paper have suggested that the reporters and columnists 
of the Times and Post were the individuals to whom the 
administration primarily targeted their information 
campaign. Jones suggests this in his text as does 
Cornwell.7 Jones goes as far as to name some of the 
columnists working for the Times or the Post with whom 
government people regularly keep in contact in order to 
cultivate a confidential relationship. 8 
The Washington Post and the New York Times both 
presented a relatively favorable treatment of the aid 
program in the initial weeks. In viewing the editorial 
comment one sees this in both the editorial staff and the 
columnists of both papers. Overall, commentary appeared 
favorable and supportive. If one concentrates on observing 
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these editorials for instances of symbolic or emotional 
language, one can find examples of their usage. If we 
recall that symbolic language is that which elicits an 
emotional response from the audience, either a threat or an 
assurance, then it merely becomes the task of the analyst to 
read tne commentary to determine whether the language used 
could be judged as emotional. Indeed, the works by Lasswell 
and others suggest a variety of words and phrases which fall 
into the category of symbolic language. Often symbolic 
language, it should be remembered, is emotional without 
being very specific. The ambiguity of this language is what 
makes it so effective in persuading people towards a 
specific course of action. 
Beginning with the Washington Post, from the day after 
the British submitted the notes to the State Department 
concerning Greece and Turkey, the editorial comment of the 
Post appeared favorable to such a program. Much of the 
reportage included terms and phrases which could be 
considered consistent with the criteria established by 
Lasswell, Edelman, Bennett and others for symbolic language. 
In the March 1, 1947 issue an editorial appeared titled 
World Crisis in which the following sentence held a 
prominent location, 
A statesman thinks of the next generation not 
the next election and there will be no next 
generation if we ~o not grapple with our world 
responsibilities. 
Clearly the threat implied by this sentence is obvious, 
however, in the sentence as well as in the column, the 
threat is never fully explained but is left relatively 
ambiguous. We know that we should fear the Communists and 
that we will have to face up to them but what is never 
specifically explained is why. 
On March 3, an editorial by Joseph Alsop employed the 
following passages, 
In the past weeks the optimistic foundation of 
American world policy has quite literally been 
shattered by a series of hammer blows, President 
Truman has to decide what to do about it ..•• The 
Greek situation began to deteriorate. The rising 
Greek crisis imposed demands which the British 
government lacked resources to meet •••• The security 
of Turkey depends on Greece •••• The facts of the world 
situation, so they say, urgently require broad scale 
action. The best approach, therefore, is to base the 
appeal to Congress on the real issue. This, the 
American people will understand.lo 
The threats in the preceding passages by Alsop are 
apparent as is the reassurance that swift American action 
and resolve by the American people can halt the 
deterioration of American security throughout the world, 
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and this swift action will come about by a clear presentation 
of the facts to the American public. What also is suggested 
in the preceding passages is the fact that Alsop might be 
getting his information from some source within the 
administration. This is evident by the statement made by 
Alsop regarding a need for action. Alsop states in the 
middle of the sentence, "so they say." Apparently, "they" 
could be someone in the administration explaining to Alsop 
in somewhat dramatic terms the course American policy must 
take. 
Other columns in the Post during that week carried a 
similar message and the points were made using similar 
language. On March 4, in a column by Mark Sullivan titled 
"U.S. Must Assume World Leadership," the following passage 
was printed. 
The hour is here when the United States must 
announce that it accepts its own destiny as the chief 
world power. We must fulfill the demands of that 
position, no matter what it costs if we eventually, 
along with other people, are to survive as free 
men. 11 
In a column, in the March 9 issue of the Post titled 
"A Test Case in Greece," Andre Visson called the Middle 
East, referring to Greece and Turkey, the "worlds number 1 
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powderkeg" and argued, "it is a great responsibility, but we 
must assume it, for the alternative would be further Soviet 
expansion. 012 
Also in the March 9 issue of the Post columnist 
Marquis Childs penned the following, 
Disorder and anarchy threaten in large areas of the 
earth. Greece is a small example of a mere pinpoint on 
the tapestry that shows fhe apocalyptic horsemen on the 
not too distant horizon. 3 (emphasis added) 
On March 10 in an editorial by Barnett Never, titled 
"New Policy for a Troubled Age," the following passages were 
cited, 
It is not enough to supply aid to Greece, we should 
strengthen the truly democratic forces in that Balkan 
Kingdom •••• If we fail in Greece either b1
4
default or 
incompetence our troubles will multiply. 
(emphasis added) 
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And on March 12, the day of the President's announcement, the 
Post printed the following editorial comments. 
The United States is the enemy of aggression - the 
sworn enemy by reason of her commitments under the 
United Nations, the natural enemy by reason of her 
power. President Truman will presumably make this idea 
today. 15 (emphasis added) 
Sumner Welles in his article titled "Democratic World 
Looks to U.S." printed the following, "the chestnuts are 
American as well as British." Welles also states: 
The issue could not be plainer, if the United States 
acquieses to the extension of Soviet domination over 
Greece, Turkey will soon therafter come within the Soviet 
orbit. The Levant, the Arab Statef and North Africa will 
then lie open to Soviet expansion. 6 (emphasis added) 
The preceeding passages suggest a variety of things 
about the use of symbolic language by the Press. From the 
discussion of a new "destiny" for the United States in the 
World by Mark Sullivan and Andre Visson to the threatening 
forecasts and biblical allusions of Sumner Welles and Marquis 
Childs. Also included in the columns were numerous 
references to democracy, freedom, security, peace, etc. but 
seldom any specific mention of what the true threat might 
have been, the references were always clouded by the often 
dramatic yet seldom clear language of political rhetoric. 
Only occasionally was any reference made to the possibility 
that a U.S. response in Greece and Turkey was necessitated by 
a vacuum in the balance of power. 
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The case of the New York Times is similar to that of 
the Washington Post. Hanson w. Baldwin, for example, 
writing in the March 2 issue of the New York Times in an 
article favored a "world role" for the U.S. He also noted 
that it was important that the U.S. must "avert the decline 
of the Western civilization, and a reversion to nihilism and 
the dark ages." He attributed this decline to the 
"aggressive and expanding power if the Soviet Union."17 
On March 3, the Times editorial staff printed the 
following: 
Truman's request for $350,000,000 ••• to back up 
Greece and keep the key citadel of the eastern 
Mediterranean and the whole Miig1e East from being 
inundated by the Russian tide. (emphasis added) 
On March 5, columnist James Reston printed the 
following regarding the situation in Greece, 
it is not a conflict between left and right 
but between those who ~elieve in civil rights 
and those who do not.l 
On March 9, Reston stated "the communist menace to an 
unsupported Greece is real. 1120 On March 12 Res ton 
stated "The danger of a communist flood is apparent."21 
And finally, on the day that Truman was to make his 
announcement to Congress, the Times staff printed the 
following: 
(The United States) will ring down the curtain 
on an epoch in America's foreign policy and begin 
a new chapter •••• The United States has taken its 
position in the front ranks among nations determined to 
check the further expansion of Russian dominati~~ and 
to strengthen the frontiers of Western freedom. 
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Again in the preceding passages from the Times one 
sees the utilization of symbolic or highly emotive language 
in reference to the Greek situation. From Baldwin's fears 
of the "decline of the Western civilization and a reversion 
to the nihilism of the dark ages" to Reston's "inundation by 
the Russian tide" one can see examples of overly dramatic 
explanations of events. If one carefully views events in 
Greece and Turkey from the objective historical accounts of 
what happened, one begins to see a picture appear that is 
neither extremely threatening nor suggestive of an imminent 
crisis.23 What appeared to be occurring were civil wars 
in states which had corrupt governments. Those trying to 
overthrow the governments in these states-primarily 
disaffected members of the military and political 
parties24-were receiving support from the Soviets. The 
threat of a "Russian tide" is hardly implied by this. Most 
authors, including George Kennan, the architect of 
containment policy, have maintained that the threats were 
not as great as they were made out to be. Kennan notes that 
he and others in the State Department saw the threat as 
being more political than military.25 Indeed the 
research by Charles Hermann indicates that the threat was 
neither high nor imminent. One must ask then, why were the 
presentations in the press so dramatic. 
Perhaps it would have been more appropriate for the 
columnists to discuss the situations in their realistic or 
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power politics context. Two states emerging from a world 
war more powerful than any other states on the planet would 
naturally be threatened by each other because of their 
capabilities for achieving their competing interests. The 
vacuum left in the balance after the axis powers had been 
defeated and England had been devastated thrust both the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. into positions which had traditionally 
been held by the large European states in balancing and 
preventing countervailing power to prevent the other side 
from aggression. 26 It is precisely this type of 
activity which George Kennan argued in his long telegram 
from Moscow,27 and the famous "X" 2 8 article. He 
viewed the activities of the Soviet Union in terms of power 
politics, not solely of ideological opposition between East 
and West. Yet with minor exceptions as seen earlier, much 
of the justifications for aid by columnists was in 
ideological terms. Some evidence suggests that a 
presentation of the facts in terms of power politics might 
not have been successful. John Spanier has noted that in 
the immediate period following World War II there existed an 
attitude among the American people that things should return 
to normal. 
The United States had historically drawn a 
clear-cut distinction between war and peace in its 
approach to foreign policy. Peace was characterized by 
a state of harmony among nations; power politics, on the 
other hand, was considered abnormal and war a crime. In 
peacetime, one needed to pay little or no attention to 
foreign problems; indeed to do so would have diverted 
men from their individual, materialistic concerns 
and upset the whole scale of social values. The effect 
of this attitude was clear: Americans turned their 
attention toward the outside world with reluctance and 
usually only when they felt provoked--that is when the 
foreign menace had become so clear that it could no 
longer be ignored.29 
This isolationist attitude was also prevalent among 
many members of Congress and it was this sentiment which 
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most of the authors who wrote about the Truman Doctrine said 
needed to be overcome.30 When the success of Acheson's 
dramatic presentation to congressional leaders was seen, it 
was decided that a similar presentation should be made to 
the American press and public. Thus, a presentation was 
devised and delivered to the public on March 12, 1947 which 
requested large amounts of aid and assistance, and employed 
numerous terms and phrases which could be considered 
symbolic.31 The question remains: to what extent were 
so called elites within the administration manipulating 
opinion through the deliberate use of imprecise language to 
confuse the public and elicit a response arrived at through 
a primary or emotional thought process. In addition, if 
administration elites were indeed manipulating opinion, when 
and how did they cross the dividing line between education 
and propaganda. 
These seem to be important questions which to this 
point have been unanswered by the evidence presented. 
Perhaps some answers can be found in the biographies and 
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autobiographies of those individuals most influential in the 
decision making process. 
If one is to prove that manipulation of opinion 
through the deliberate use of emotional rhetoric existed, 
one need also prove that those doing the manipulating fully 
understood the situations in a rational way and fully 
understood the uses of symbolism and propaganda in the 
context of mass persuasion. If deliberate intent cannot be 
proven then one has merely made a case for education, not 
manipulation. In other words, if evidence suggests that the 
officials responsible for devising the wording of the Truman 
Doctrine actually perceived the threat in ideological terms 
and crisis fear then it would be difficult to suggest that 
they were deliberately manipulating opinion. Their 
activities of mobilizing support would probably fall into 
the category of education, or to use Berry's term, 
"teaching" the public. 
To begin with, the memoirs of President Truman shed 
some light onto the preceptions of the individual most 
prominent in the decision making process.32 
When reading President Truman's memoirs, especially 
regarding the era of the Cold War and the Truman Doctrine, 
one is immediately struck by the highly emotional and 
ideologically symbolic terms with which Truman apparently 
perceived the Greek and Turkish situations. 
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The ideas and traditions of our nation demanded 
that we come to the aid of Greece and Turkey and that we 
put the world on notice that it would be our policy to 
support the3 ~ause of freedom whenever it was threatened. 
This type of language in reference to the situations in 
Greece and Turkey is consistent with the notion that key 
symbols and slogans have a similar appeal to society as a 
whole. Lasswell, Edelman and Bennett all argue that 
cultural processes direct the way in which these individuals 
respond to symbolic messages or cues. One can, therefore, 
presume that these cultural processes will affect the way in 
which individuals will perceive domestic and international 
affairs. Henry Kissinger argues, 
It is part of our folklore that, while other 
nations have interests we have responsibilities; 
while other nations are concerned with equilibrium, 
we are3~oncerned with the legal requirements of peace. 
Thus it is quite possible, and indeed highly likely 
based on a reading of his memoirs, that President Truman 
genuinely perceived events in Greece and Turkey as crises, 
assaults on freedom, and a clash between democracy and 
communism, rather than solely as threats to the power 
interests of the United States. Some have argued that this 
was precisely the case and that Truman's perceptions of 
Soviet conflict were primarily effected by the opinions of 
James Forrestal, George Kennan and Dean Acheson.3 5 
Truman argues, 
65 
What course the free world should take in the 
face of the threat of Russian Totalitarianism was a 
subject I had discussed with my foreign policy advisers 
on many occasions in the years just past •••• The studies 
which Marshall and Acheson brought to me and which we 
examined together made it plain that serious risks would 
be involved. But the alternative would be disastrous to 
our securit~6and to the security of free nations everywhere. 
It is, therefore, quite possible that Blanchard is 
correct, and Truman's perceptions were indeed affected by 
the influence of his advisers. James Forrestal, for example 
makes quite a few references to discussions he had with the 
President and cabinet members, where Greece and Turkey were 
the topic.37 Arthur Rogow, who wrote Forrestal's 
biography called Forrestal an "ardent anti-communist" and 
points out that it was Forrestal who seized onto Kennan's 
reports as evidence that Soviet ideology was the main threat 
to international peace.38 One can find numerous 
references to Forrestal's opinions of communism when reading 
his memoirs. LaFebre notes that Forrestal sent Truman a 
"highly emotional memorandum" on March 7, 1947. His note 
suggested that the threat in Greece and Turkey equalled that 
of World War II. 
Acheson, as well appears to affirm that his perception 
of the Greek-Turkish situations was one of a communist 
threat primarily based on a conflict of ideologies, not a 




Only slowly did it dawn upon us that the whole 
world structure and order that we had inherited from the 
nineteenth century was gone and that the struggle to 
replace it would be directed from two bitterly ~~posed 
and ideologically irreconcilable power centers. 
These statements indicate that Acheson was aware of 
the fact that while balance of power concerns were 
important, it was primarily a conflict of ideologies. Lloyd 
Gardiner appears to agree with this assessment of Acheson's 
views. 
The real issue, wrote Louis Halle, one of Acheson's 
associates in the State Department at the time of the 
Truman Doctrine, was the balance of power: "As in 1917, 
as in 1941, it was still not possible to tell the 
American people what the real issue was." Halle's 
effort to put the cold war into a "realistic" mold might 
do justice to ~achiavelli, but not to the convictions of 
Dean Acheson.4 
Much evidence, therefore seems to suggest that Acheson 
genuinely perceived the conflict in the terms in which he 
annunciated to his associates and superiors. McLellan notes 
about Acheson 
••• his convictions about individual freedom 
were salient and vital and not simply i~ ideological 
mask for economic and elite interests. 
While no evidence could be found to refute the argument that 
Acheson genuinely "understood" the Greek-Turkish situation 
in the same way he described it, evidence does exist that 
suggest he was aware of the uses of symbolic language as a 
form of political control. In a 1946 speech to the Harvard 
Club Acheson acknowledged that "propaganda, which uses 
familiar and respected words and ideas to implant images," 
is a standard practice among states for inducing behavior. 
This practice included something which Acheson called the 
"new psychology of crisis. 0 42 
Although this does not imply that propaganda or 
symbolic language was deliberately used to induce behavior 
in the case of Acheson's presentations and drafting the 
speech, it does indicate that he could have knowingly done 
so. McLellan notes about Acheson's "dramatic" presentation 
to Congressional leaders, "what Acheson had to say was said 
with the deliberate intention of stimulating his 
listeners. 043 
67 
While certain evidence exists on both sides of the 
coin regarding Acheson's intentions, it would appear that 
the bulk of the evidence would tend to indicate that Acheson 
genuinely perceived the Greek-Turkish situations in crisis 
terms and as an ideological conflict between the United 
States representing freedom, and the Soviet Union 
representing totalitarianism. 
As for George Kennan, the reverse seems to be the 
case. The Kennan memorandum sent from Moscow to Washington 
in February of 1946 has been seen by many as the primary 
motivation and justification being the policies undertaken 
by the United States regarding the Soviet Union in the 
post-war era. Kennan's telegram outlined his own 
perceptions of the Soviet threat. This document consisted 
of five separate parts each covering a specific aspect of 
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Soviet-American relations. Much of Kennan's analysis of the 
conflict between the two states appeared to be centered on 
the ideological clash between communism and capitalism; the 
discussion ranged from viewing Soviet propaganda statements 
and party line to offering suggestions for U.S. policies vis 
a vis the Soviets. However, references to the seeking and 
maintenance of power and alliances by both states are 
abundant in the memo. This indicates that Kennan perceived 
that the true nature of the conflict might indeed be a 
balancing of power between the two sides. Regarding 
possible activities of the Soviet state which must be 
watched, Kennan notes, 
Internal policies devoted to increasing in every 
way strength and prestige of the Soviet state; intensive 
military industrialization; maximum development of armed 
forces; great displays to impress outsides; continual 
secretiveness about internal matters, designed to 
conceil weaknesses and keep opponents in the 
dark. 
Regarding the directions the United States should take in 
response to these Soviet activities, Kennan notes: 
[Soviet power isl impervious to logic of reason, 
and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this 
reason it can easily withdraw-and usually does-when 
strong resistance is encountered at any point. This if 
the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his 
readiness to use it, he solely has to do so. If 
situations are properly handled there need be no 
prestige-engaging showdowns •••• Gauged against Western 
world as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker 
force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree 
of cohesion, firmness, and vigor which Western world can 
muster. And igis is factor which it is within our power 
to influence. 
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Clearly, what Kennan is describing in these two 
excerpts from his telegram is a classic power confrontation 
between the two central actors in the balance. The 
terminology used by Kennan-defining relations among states, 
and interests of states in terms of power, and discussions of 
gaining and maintaining alliances-is consistent with the 
realist school of international politics. The inference is 
that Kennan must have understood that the U.S.-Soviet 
conflict was not merely a clash between ideologies but a 
clash between the most powerful and predominant actors in 
international politics. However, if one continues :to read 
the Kennan telegram, it becomes apparent that Kennan would 
occasionally use ideological or emotional terms to describe 
the conflict. "World communism is like malignant parasite 
which feeds only on diseased tissue."46 
In foreign countries Communists will, as a 
rule, work toward destruction of all forms oa personal 
independence; economic, political or moral." 7 
Indeed, in his memoirs Kennan argues regarding the 
Moscow telegram, 
I read it over today with a horrified amusement. 
Much of it reads exactly like one of those primers put 
out by alarmed Congressional committees or by the 
Daughters of the American Revolution, designed to 
arous7 the i~tizenry to the threat of the Communist 
conspiracy. 
So it appears quite possible that Kennan, as well as 
Acheson, Truman and Forrestal "understood" the situation in 
Greece, at the time, in the emotional terms in which it was 
presented to the American public. While it is also possible 
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that after the fact, they might have come to understand the 
events in the context of power politics, it is, perhaps, 
more likely, that in the initial stages of the conflict they 
understood it in the same type of black and white, good 
versus bad type of terms in which our culture tends to view 
things. Kennan notes in his memoirs that he later regretted 
the language of the Truman Doctrine, because 
We would find it necessary to give aid, over the 
ensuing years, to a number of regimes which would hardly 
qualify foi it on the basis of their democratic 
character. 9 
While this passage clearly reflects Kennan's awareness of 
the non-ideological necessities of power politics alliances, 
it must be remembered that it was written many years after 
the Truman Doctrine. Morganthau notes, 
The actor on the political scene cannot help 
•playing an act" by concealing the true nature of his 
political actions behind the mask of a political 
ideology. The more removed the individual is from a 
particular power struggle, ~Be more likely he is to 
understand its true nature. 
Thus, while as an author, in later years, Kennan might 
have clearly or realistically understood the situation, in 
his years as an actor in the policy process, he might have 
genuinely perceived the Greek-Turkish situation in emotional 
crisis terms. Kennan's analysis of Soviet intentions 
however, and his proposals for United States policy regarding 
the Soviets has been classified as being a realist or 
•particularist•51 position: but, it has also been argued 
that Kennan perceived ideology to be an important element 
because the Soviets had been using the ideology of communism 
as "an instrument with which to project influence beyond 
Russian borders. 1152 It is thus:" difficult to accurately 
assess what position Kennan genuinely had regarding the 
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events of 1946-1947, but it does appear that the possibility 
exists that Kennan might have perceived the situation in 
ideological terms. Certainly his report served as the 
foundation for the decision makers understanding, of the 
situation, and the preceeding pages have indicated that they 
appeared to understand the situation in an "idealist" rather 
than a strictly "realist" perspective. 
In addition to Kennan's memorandum and subsequent 
article in Foreign Affairs, 53 it has been argued that 
other documents played an important role in determining the 
United States policy of containing the Soviets. 54 While 
these documents probably served to formulate the goals of 
containment, they also might have provided policy makers 
with the means for achieving them. 
Language similar to that in the Kennan memorandum can 
be found in the "Top Secret• communications sent to 
President Truman by his advisors. The first of these 
documents, sent to the President on September 24, 1946, was 
drafted by special counsel to the President, Clark 
Clifford, 
after consultations with the Secretaries of 
State, War, Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Attorney General, the Director of c5gtral Intelligence 
and other administration officials. 
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The document essentially was an attempt to formulate a 
coherent policy for the United States regarding the Soviet 
Union and tended to adopt the view of the Soviets put forth 
by Kennan in his telegram. Indeed much of what Clifford 
called for in his proposals paralleled those put forth by 
Kennan. 
The language of the Clifford memorandum, like the 
Kennan memorandum, tended to highlight ideological 
differences between the Soviets and the United States as 
being one of the major sources of the dispute. Clifford 
argues that the security of the United States, the Soviet 
Union, 
and the rest of the World as well, is being 
jeopardized by aggressive military imperialism 
much as ~gat in which the Soviet Union is now 
engaged. 
Clifford also refers to the need for the United States to 
•support and assist all democratic countries which are in 
any way menaced by the Soviet Union;" 57 he also 
suggested that 
the United States has no aggressive intentions 
and that the nature of our society is such that 
peaceful coexistenc5
8
of capitalistic and communistic 
states is possible. 
In addition to this type of emotional language, however, one 
notices many passages which imply that Clifford and his 
contributors were aware of the conflict in its power 
politics context. For example, 
The language of military power is the only · 
language which disciples of power politics understand. 
The United States must use that language in order that 
Soviet leaders will realize that our government is 
determined to uphold the int5~sts of its citizens and 
the rights of small nations. 
Other passages indicate that Clifford and his 
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co-authors were aware of the uses of propaganda and symbolic 
language as a means of public persuasion. 
The United States should realize that Soviet 
propaganda is dangerous (especially when American 
"imperialism" is emphasized) and should avoid any 
actions ~Bich give an appearance of truth to Soviet 
charges. 
Again, one is left without a clear picture of what was 
the perception of those individuals in the information 
relaying roles. While it might appear, from their rhetoric 
that ideology played the primary role in their policies 
regarding the Soviets, it appears that power concerns were 
also given consideration by those formulating these 
policies. 
One last document is argued as having been of primary 
importance in contributing to the knowledge and perceptions 
of those formulating the policies regarding the Soviets, and 
the aid policies regarding other countries.61 
This document, issued by the joint chiefs of staff, 
maintained that certain areas had higher priorities for aid 
and assistance, based on their "importance to the national 
security of the United States. 1162 Seemingly stressing 
power politics considerations as the motivation for policy, 
the document makes numerous references to "the event of 
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war with our ideological enemies"; suggesting that a 
motivation for a policy of containment, achieved by means of 
foreign assistance, might indeed be idealistic as well as 
realistic or strategic. This type of emotional and 
calculated rhetoric is repeated throughout the document, and 
in the.context of whether policy makes had specific notions 
of what motivated their decisions is primarily confusing. 
If, as many manipulation theorists have argued, policy makes 
indeed perceived power politics considerations as the 
primary motivation behind their decisions to supply aid to 
countries, then emphasizing ideological differences between 
states or opponents should have been used primarily as the 
means for marshalling public support. It would not be 
likely that these ideological statements would show up in 
the private papers of policy makers if they were merely 
employed for their symbolic value. Indeed, one might expect 
to find some mention of any attempted manipulation, or at 
least, statements which would imply such manipulation. But 
these statemetns were not to be found in this research. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The central question of this paper has essentially 
been is there sufficient evidence available to justify 
claims of "manipulation of opinion" of the American public 
with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, or does it 
appear that what occurred could have been, more 
appropriately, termed an informational or educational 
campaign? In other words, were the tone and the rhetoric of 
the President's message strategically designed to elicit a 
response from an apathetic public and a hesitant congress, 
and, if so, was there some purpose other than idealism which 
motivated American actions regarding the supplying of aid? 
While there is certainly some evidence that the 
administration tended to employ rather dramatic, if not 
indeed symbolic, language in presenting the issue, there 
appears to be no solid proof to lead one to conclude that 
any "manipulation" occurred. One might even conclude that 
evidence appears to indicate that those so-called elites who 
formulated the containment policy and the means used to 
achieve it genuinely understood the situation, in its 
initial stages, in the same terms which they employed in 
their public rhetoric, implying that they were not being 
deceptive when presenting issues to the public. 
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The evidence compiled by reviewing the autobiographies 
and biographies of the main actors, and the official 
government documents of the period appears to indicate that 
those elites in the policy process had perceptions of the 
issues which framed them as questions of morality and 
ideology more so than questions of national interest defined 
in terms of acquiring power or economic gain. For the most 
part, it appears that Truman, Acheson, Kennan, Jones and 
other members of the administration described in memoirs and 
to friends their perceptions of the Greek-Turkish situation 
in the same way in which the situation was presented to the 
public on March 12, 1947. It is therefore, unlikely that a 
conspiracy to deceive the American public and attain support 
by deliberately manipulating information and language was 
carried out; or at least, it is unlikely that such a 
conspiracy could be clearly shown. 
While it is certainly possible that these individuals 
carried on deception when they wrote their memoirs, this is 
probably not the case. To begin with, memoirs are generally 
accepted as accurate representations of an individuals 
perceptions of issues. Moreover, if it was manipulation, one 
must assume a vast amount of knowledge or awareness about the 
public on the part of the administration that just didn't 
appear to exist. 
The newspaper coverage of the period is also important 
to this story. The language used by the press, which 
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was prominent in the weeks prior to the announcement of the 
Truman Doctrine is quite similar in its tone to that employed 
by Truman in his public rhetoric. It was often emotionally 
laden and it employed numerous references to crisis, threats, 
democracy, freedom, Communism and other terms and phrases 
which arguably could fall within the parameters of symbolic 
language. 
It is possible to infer a number of things about the 
press coverage. For instance, one might assume, as would 
Cohen1 that the language was similar because press people 
are ready to accept all the information that government 
officials relate to the press, be it propaganda or not. 
Since many historians of this period have pointed out that 
both official2 and unofficial3 actors seemed to supply 
information to the press during this period many have 
suggested that the press was essentially led along the 
propaganda path. 
Still another scenario would have the press leading the 
administration in its perceptions of the issues.4 Since 
the press coverage preceded most of the public rhetoric on 
the issue, it is possible that this coverage colored the 
administration's thinking on the issue. Most would contend, 
however, that officials in a government are not often 
affected by perceptions of issues held among the press and 
the public. In most cases, government officials form their 
perceptions of events and issues in foreign policy from 
a variety of influences, perhaps the least important being 
the press and the public.s 
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Finally, a third inference one might gain by an 
examination of the press coverage, and indeed the public and 
private comments of the central actors in the formulation of 
the Truman Doctrine, is that one of the key variables which 
affects perceptions, anyone's perceptions, about issues of 
foreign relations, is that of a belief system. The best 
information available to decision makers and press people, 
must first filter through their belief system to be 
understood. This belief system then, certainly colors any 
understanding of an issue, and this directs the way in which 
individuals phrase their perception of issues when attempting 
to relay this information to others or educate them. 
The fact that there was a similarity in rhetoric 
between the press and the decision making elites within the 
administration suggests that a common belief system exists in 
the United States which affects even the most rational 
thinking and cynical levels of our society. And, perhaps, 
this belief system is what Bennett, Edelman, and Lasswell 
refer to when they discuss the notion of cultural processes 
and myths affecting the way Americans understand politics and 
direct the way they respond to political language. Taken one 
step further, however, one might presume that these cultural 
processes and myths also effect the way in which decision 
makers genuinely understand the issues and this would 
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certainly direct their rhetoric. Again we are back to the 
question of whether officials in the government are aware of 
the facility with which opinion can be manipulated and, 
therefore, make calculated attempts to do so. Both Edelman 
and Lasswell appear to be clear on this point; Edelman argues 
that in general American politics is consistently full of 
examples of administration elites using language which is not 
necessarily consistent with their actual beliefs, as a method 
for political control and public support.6 Lasswell, 
specifically referring to the use of language as propaganda 
in foreign affairs, concurs.7 Bennett, however is not as 
clear on this point. He often suggests that cultural 
processes and belief systems are consistent at all levels of 
society; 8 implying that it is quite possible that decision 
makers impart information to the public after that 
information has already been filtered through their own 
belief system. The public then responds because the decision 
makers belief system is consistent with their own. 
This notion of belief system or perception is very 
important as a variable in foreign policy analysis. Both 
Joseph deRivera9 and Gerald HopplelO have put a great 
emphasis on this variable as affecting foreign policy 
decisions. Also Michael Sullivan argues that individual 
images and perceptions should be considered "a crucial 
independent agent accounting for individual behavior. 1111 
Kegley and Wittkopf refer to something called the "law of 
anticipated reactions" 12 which hypothesizes that 
because 
there is every reason to believe that they embrace 
the basic value assumptions of American society ••• 
decision maker screen out certain alternatives 
because of their anticipation that the options would 
be adversely received, an anticipation borr of the 
American value tradition which they share. 3 
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This "law of anticipated reactions" essentially in the focus 
of the analysis of this paper. Did administration officials 
accurately and consciously determine beforehand that there 
would be certain factors limiting the ways in which the 
policy could be presented for approval, thus opting to employ 
a distorted presentation of events. Or did they genuinely 
them to the public. 
Keyley and Wittkop£ consider that this latter point is 
likely. 
In fact, decision makers may not even be conscious 
of the way in which political culture helps to ~ifine 
in their minds the range of permissable policy. 
Daniel J. Elazar concurs, noting that, political culture 
often places limits or constraints on individuals in the 
policy making process, and these limits are so effective 
because, "those limited are unaware of the limitations placed 
upon them. 1115 
That individual decision making could be swayed by 
their belief system or ideology in policy formulation is 
consistent with the arguments of Hans Morganthau. As noted 
earlier in this essay, Morganthau maintained that ideology 
plays a role in the making of foreign policy. 
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While all politics is necessarily pursuit of power, 
ideologies render involvement in that conte~t for power 
psychologically
1
gnd morally acceptable to.the actors and 
their audience. 
But Morganthau also notes, 
the deeper the individual is involved in the 
power struggle, the less likell he is to see the 
power struggle for what it is. 7 
. 
Hence, decision makers, even those individuals who are 
attempting to employ an extremely rational thought process, 
are subject to their unconscious belief system. The 
information that is given to high leveled decision makers 
must pass through a series of ideological filters before 
policy is formulated. These filters include the various 
perceptions and images which the decision makers have of 
this information. These perceptions would invariably be 
conditioned by the decision makers values and beliefs. His 
values and beliefs would, in turn, be conditioned by 
societal values and beliefs which have been passed onto the 
individual through such means as myth, folklore, the 
educational system and family. Beyond the effect that 
belief system has on high level decision makers, is the 
effect that belief system has on the lower level information 
gatherers and disseminators. Certainly, their own values 
and beliefs would condition their own perceptions of 
information and, thus, would effect their interpretations of 
that information when relaying it to superiors. One would 
of course, expect that lower level decision makers would be 
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subjected to the same societal values and cultural processes 
that higher level decision makers are subjected to. 
It is tremendously important, therefore, to consider 
image or belief system as an intervening or a conditioning 
variable when analyzing foreign policy formulation. The aid 
policies of the Truman Doctrine are one example where belief 
system apparently played a large role in the formulation of 
policy. The ideological beliefs of the decision makers, if 
not directly formulating the perceptions of the decision 
makers, were certainly important as a conditioning variable 
in the formulation of the decision. This being the case, it 
is difficult to conclude that manipulation occurred or that 
propaganda was used. As noted by Cohen, there is a fine 
"aividing line between education and propaganda" and it is 
difficult to determine at what point this line is crossed. 
In the case of the Truman Doctrine, however, it appears that 
the informational campaign and the rhetoric fell more on the 
side of education than propaganda. Hence, it is hard to 
substantiate the manipulation thesis. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1: (U.S.-AIPO-March 28, 1947) 
Do you approve or disapprove of the bill asking for 
250 million dollars to aid Greece? Asked of a 
national cross-section of persons who had heard or 









1. Do you approve of our government providing money 
to Greece to help her recover from war? 
2. Do you approve or disapprove of our sending 
military supplies to help the Greek government? 
3. Do you approve or disapprove of our sending 














10 % 16 % 
Do you approve or disapprove of our Government's 
policy of sending aid to Greece? Asked in June 1947. 
Approve 55% 
Disapprove 19% 
Qualified approval 11% 
Undecided 15% 
TABLE 4: (U.S.-AIPO-March, 1947) 
Do you think that the present 
government has the backing of 
the majority--that is, more 
than half--of the Greek people? 
Do you think that the present 
Turkish government has the 
backing of the majority--that 
ts, more than half--of the 
Turkish people? 
TABLE 5: 







Economically sound 1 
National integrity 3 
Preservation of Order 1 


















situation . 1 
National security 2 
Invasion 1 
Enemy occupation 1 
Internal strife 1 
Tragic conditions 1 
Militant minorities 1 
Misery 1 
Exploitation 2 
Political chaos 1 
Terrorist activites 1 
Communists 2 
Border violations 1 
Coercion 4 
Aggressive movements 1 
Impose 3 






TABLE 6: CU.S.-AIPO-November 2, 1947) 
Would you favor or oppose lending Western European 
countries like England, France, Holland, and Norway 
about 20 billion dollars over the next four years to 




~o opinion 22% 
TABLE 7: CU.S.-AIPO-November 2, 1947) 
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Would you favor or oppose sending Western European 
countries like England, France, Holland and Norway 
about 20 billion dollars worth of goods from this 
country in order to improve conditions and keep those 




No opinion 16% 
